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I. Introduction
The Internet has, in recent decades, become the center of our
world. It is where we search for information, how we keep up on
current events in real time, and now, where we share copious
amounts of information about ourselves. The boom of social
1
2
3
4
networking websites such as Facebook, MySpace, and Twitter has
allowed individuals to disseminate personal information at an
alarming rate—from our basic contact information, to our interests,
to photographs, and updates about our every move, and thought.

* University of California, Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate 2011.
Stanford University, B.A. American Studies, with Departmental Honors and Distinction,
2007. Danielle would like to thank Professor John Diamond for overseeing this paper,
and her family for their unyielding love, encouragement, and support.
1. See James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1142 (2009)
(Social networks are defined as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct
a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users
with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and
those made by others within the system.”) (internal citation omitted).
2. FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
3. MYSPACE, http://www.myspace.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
4. TWITTER, http://www.twitter.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
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With so many people uploading sensitive information to their
Facebook profiles, there have been many unintended consequences—
“[j]obs have been lost, reputations smeared, embarrassing secrets
5
broadcast to the world.” Most significantly, however, the rise of
social networks as a new medium of communication has provided a
new frontier of how the government can gain access and use that
information in criminal investigations and prosecutions.
On December 1, 2009, The Electronic Frontier Foundation
(“EFF”), along with the Samuelson Law, Technology, and Public
Policy Clinic at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law
(“Samuelson Clinic”), filed a lawsuit against several government
agencies seeking the release of records under the Freedom of
6
Information Act (“FOIA”), concerning how those agencies use
social-networking websites as investigative, surveillance, and data
7
collection tools. This lawsuit marks an important acknowledgment
that there are not clearly defined ways in which governmental
agencies take advantage of the copious amounts of data provided by
social networking sites. The Samuelson Clinic also co-sponsored a
conference (“Samuelson Conference”) addressing the legal and
ethical issues surrounding data gathering on social networking sites,
8
the contents of which will be referred to throughout this note.
The EFF’s lawsuit is especially important because social
networking statistics are phenomenal: Facebook has hit the three
hundred million users mark, MySpace has one hundred and twentyfive million accounts, and in September 2009, Twitter had twenty
9
million visitors. Amongst the eighteen- to twenty-four-year-old
10
demographic, almost seventy-five percent are using social networks.
This Note will examine the ways in which social networking sites
and the government’s search for information collide. Part Two will

5. Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 1140. (Noting that “[o]ver a hundred million
people have uploaded personally sensitive information to Facebook, and many of them
have been badly burnt as a result.”)
6. Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2010).
7. Elect. Frontier Found. v. Dept. of Defense, 2009 WL 4813489 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 1,
2009). The case also names the Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland
Security, Department of Justice, Department of Treasury, and Office of the Director of
National Intelligence as defendants. See also Press Release, Electronic Frontier
Foundation, Lawsuit Demands Answers About Social-Networking Surveillance (Nov. 30,
2009) available at http://www.eff.org/press/archives/2009/11/30.
8. Samuelson Conference, Social Networks: Friends or Foes? Confronting Online
Legal and Ethical Issues in the Age of Social Networking (Oct. 23, 2009), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/socialnetworking/schedule.htm.
[hereinafter
Samuelson Conference]
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look at Facebook, examining its privacy policies and how information
and data are shared on the site. It will then discuss the ways in which
the government has used both Facebook and similar social
networking sites in its investigations. Part Three will outline the
statutory framework through which the government operates to gain
access to electronic data and analyze its impact by examining case law
surrounding those information privacy statutes as they apply to
Fourth Amendment litigation. Finally, Part Four will discuss the
intersection between the law as it currently stands, and social
networking sites. The law has not quite kept pace with the speed of
technology. As a result, the boundaries of individual privacy—as
applied to the government’s use of social networking information—
are in need of revisions.

II. Social Networks
Facebook’s domination of the social network market makes it an
ideal case study through which to demonstrate the enormous amount
of information that users are able to share through the social network
medium. According to the site’s Privacy Policy, “[o]ne of the primary
11
reasons people use Facebook is to share content with others.”
Facebook users share and display a vast amount of content.
Facebook users complete profiles that can contain up to about forty
12
pieces of recognizable personal information. This includes “name,
birthday, political and religious views; online and offline contact
information; gender, sexual preference, and relationship status;
favorite books, movies, and so on; educational and employment
13
history; and, of course, picture[s].” It has been further noted that
14
Facebook is storing over twenty billion photos.
What is more
alarming is that Facebook’s users share this information with
thousands of others—information which is “indexed to create
15
powerful mosaics of personal data.”

9. David Lee, Problems Unique to Social Networking and the Law, address at
Samuelson Conference, (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu
/7458.htm.
10. Id.
11. See Privacy Policy (Facebook), available at http://www.facebook.com/policy.php
(last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
12. Grimmelmann, supra note 1, at 1149.
13. Id.
14. Lee, supra note 9.
15. Jonathan Zittrain, Law in a Networked World: Privacy 2.0+, 2008 U. CHI. LEGAL.
F. 65, 100 (2008).
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Although users can control how much information they feel
comfortable sharing on Facebook and adjust their privacy settings
accordingly, it is almost certain that at least some of a user’s “friends”
16
will be able to see the content that he or she posts. For example,
hypothetically speaking, a user went to high school with Jane Doe; he
searches for her on Facebook. If her privacy settings are such that
she comes up in his search results, he can send her a message
17
requesting that she accepts his friendship. Then, the ball is in her
court. She can unequivocally accept, granting him full access to all of
the bits of information that she posts about herself, or, she can place
him on a “limited profile,” where she controls what information he
can see, by limiting his access to only certain content.
Being a user’s “friend,” however, is not the only way that
someone might gain access to a user’s information. For example, a
user might adjust his privacy settings so that everyone in his
18
19
“Networks” or all “Friends of Friends” can see certain posts. For
example, if a user posts an album with hundreds of pictures and
allows everyone in his Stanford University network to see them, then
the 50,587 members of that network (as of January 2010) would be
able to see those pictures, regardless of whether they are “friends”
with the user.
Methods of communication on social networking sites such as
Facebook are also numerous. Users can send each other messages
within the site, a feature that functions as Facebook’s own version of
emails. Users can also post messages on each other’s walls to convey
20
information that they wish to be more public.
16. “Friend” connections are the primary way that Facebook users are linked. When
users are “friends,” they generally have access to each other’s profiles and the information
that they therefore post.
17. Users can adjust their privacy settings so that, at the most narrow, they are not
searchable to anyone, even though their profile exists. At the opposite end of the
spectrum, a user can be searchable to “Everyone,” which means, anyone with a Facebook
account.
18. A “Network” is a workplace or school that a user is or has been affiliated with. In
order to join a school’s network, for example, Facebook requires that a user verify his
membership there with a valid school email address.
19. For a definition of “posts” see “Definitions,” section 17 on Facebook’s
“Statements of Rights and Resposibilities,” available at http://www.facebook.com/
terms.php (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
20. “[A] wall is a section in your profile where others can write messages to you or
leave you gifts, which are icon-like small images. The wall is a public writing space so
others who view your profile can see what has been written on your wall. Once you have
received a wall message, you can respond directly back to the friend who left it using the
“wall-to-wall” mode.”
Definition of Facebook Wall, WEBOPEDIA.COM,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/F/Facebook_wall.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
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Because there are so many pieces of data floating around and
there are so many different ways that users can be connected to one
another, it is not surprising that Facebook and other social
networking sites are rapidly becoming attractive places for the
government to find pertinent information. The FBI, for example, has
21
undercover agents in virtually every social network context.
Facebook explicitly warns that it “may disclose information pursuant
to subpoenas, court orders, or other requests (including criminal and
civil matters) if [they] have a good faith belief that the response is
22
required by law.”
There have been several instances where the government—via
local detectives, to prosecutors, to federal officials—has used
information on social networking sites as “investigative, surveillance,
23
and data collection tools.” John Carlin, Chief of Staff and Senior
Counsel to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(“FBI”), delivered the keynote address at the Samuelson Conference
where he revealed that the FBI has joined social networks and has
24
used them in a variety of circumstances.
When a Massachusetts man overdosed on heroin, local police
detectives turned to his social networking pages (on both Facebook
and MySpace) in order to get clues about the source of the drug and
25
with whom the man might have been using.
The investigating
detective explained, “People arrange to buy and sell drugs on
26
Facebook . . . we’d be foolish not to use it as an investigative tool.”
In Cincinnati, the FBI was able to arrest seventy individuals who
were associated with a violent gang called the “Taliband” by
27
analyzing their connections on social networking sites. These arrests

21. Paul Ohm, Lauren Gelman & Jack Bennett, Are You Really My Friend? The
Law and Ethics of Covert or Deceptive Data-Gathering, address at Samuelson
Conference, (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/7458.htm.
22. See How We Share Information on Facebook’s Privacy Policy, available at
http://www.facebook.com/policy/php (last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
23. Elect. Frontier Found. v. Dept. of Defense, 2009 WL 4813489 (N.D.Cal. Dec. 1,
2009).
24. John Carlin, Safety and Social Networks: the Challenge of Community Policing in
a Virtual Neighborhood, at Samuelson Conference, (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://
www.law.berkeley.edu/7458.htm.
25. Julie Masis, Is This Lawman Your Facebook Friend? Increasingly, Investigators
Use Social Networking Websites for Police Work, THE BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 11, 2009, at 1
(NORTHWEST Reg).
26. Id. The article also reveals that in an informal survey of 14 departments in the
area (Wilmington, Mass.), officials in half of them said that they use Facebook and
MySpace when conducting their detective work.
27. Carlin, supra note 24.
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resulted in a forty percent decrease in violent crimes in the area.
The FBI also used social networking data in a Colombia, Ohio gang
shooting case, which was ironically instigated by discussions on social
29
By intercepting discussions about being
networks themselves.
“dissed” on MySpace, the FBI was able to establish a motive for a
30
violent gang shooting.
Facebook also provided the means for the government to
apprehend a fugitive, Maxi Sopo, who allegedly stole more than
31
$200,000 through a bank scam in Seattle. While looking through
Sopo’s “friends” on Facebook, an Assistant United States Attorney
(“AUSA”) noticed that one of them was a former Department of
32
Justice Attorney. The AUSA contacted this former attorney, who
looked through the pictures that Sopo had posted on his Facebook
33
profile. Sopo’s pictures showed the fugitive partying in Cancun,
34
where he was ultimately caught.
Carlin also mentions that the government uses social networks to
35
catch “tax deadbeats.” As he explains, there have been instances
where individuals “claim poverty to the IRS,” but their social
networking profiles tell a different story—they brag about all of their
36
wealth and assets through photographs and “vivid descriptions.”
An interesting dialogue at the Samuelson Conference between
Paul Ohm, Lauren Gelman, and Supervisory Special FBI agent Jack
Bennett shed light upon the law and ethics of what some might call
37
“deceptive” data gathering.
Their discussion suggests that most
states have not clearly defined when it is okay and when it is not okay
38
to go undercover to gain information off of social networking sites.
Gelman does, however, consider that when a Facebook user changes
his “network” so that he can gain access to information that is

28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. It should be noted that in his speech, Carlin did not explain the legal methods
by which the FBI was able to intercept those discussions. It very well may be that the files
were publicly available.
31. Chris Ayres, The Fraud Suspect Who Was Asking to be Caught, THE TIMES
(London), Oct. 19, 2009, at 38.
32. Carlin, supra note 24.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Ohm, Gelman & Bennett, supra note 21.
38. Id.
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39

available in a different network, that constitutes deception. And
Bennett admits that the FBI uses social networks for “ID takeovers”
40
when they arrest a “bad guy.”
Both Gelman and Ohm think that there must be a new definition
of a “reasonable expectation of privacy” in the new world of social
networks. Ohm suggests that we “throw out Katz” and find
41
something new. But, Bennett offers a compelling counter-argument:
that the whole idea behind social networking is to put information
“out there for people to see” and therefore, it is “hard to believe”
that there is an expectation of privacy if a user is “opening up his
42
information for everyone to see.”
The government’s use of social networking goes beyond criminal
investigations and can involve matters of national security. Carlin
warns that terrorist groups are using those sites to recruit members
43
and spread ideologies. For example, the Facebook group “Ahlus
Sunnah wal Jama’ah” has reportedly recruited several students from
British Universities and their group page contains links to literature
such as Jihad: a Ten Part Compilation, which commands that all
44
Muslims participate in violent jihad. If extremist groups are truly
infiltrating social networking sites, then the government has a
legitimate interest in accessing data it is believes may threaten the
United States. However, the government is unclear about to what
45
extent it is privy to the abundant social networking data available.
A member of the Facebook legal department explained that
46
Facebook is committed to protecting its users’ privacies at all costs.
47
The company has a process in place for responding to subpoenas.
According to Facebook, the California-based company applies the

39. Id.
40. Id. For example, the FBI will assume the “bad guy’s” Facebook profile when he
is arrested in order to gain access to other potentially incriminating information.
41. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (extending the Fourth Amendment
to the government’s electronic eavesdropping when a person has a reasonable expectation
of privacy).
42. Ohm, Gelman & Bennett, supra note 21.
43. Carlin, supra note 24.
44. Danny Mendez, Facebook and Terrorism: A Love Hate Relationship, (Feb. 15,
2008). TECH.BLORGE.COM, http://tech.blorge.com/Structure:%20/2008/02/15/facebookand-terrorism-a-love-hate-relationship-2/.
45. See FOIA, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2010); See also EFF. v. Dept. of Defense, 2009 WL
4813489 (N.D.Cal. 2009).
46. Telephone interview with member of Facebook legal department, (Dec. 22, 2009)
(transcript with author).
47. Id.
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“strictest standards” when local sheriffs serve subpoenas for local
48
As
information, but does not accept out-of-state subpoenas.
explained in Facebook’s Terms of Service, the company will provide
information through valid legal process, which includes (as will be
discussed later) what is statutorily required, and also in cases of
imminent harm, such as kidnapping or matters of “absolute national
49
security.”
Recognizing that its primary purpose is to serve as an identity
service for people across the Internet, Facebook stresses that the site
balances protecting its users’ data with the countervailing interest of
50
assisting law enforcement in accordance with existing statutes.
Experts in the field have argued that the Electronic Communications
51
Privacy Act (“ECPA”) (discussed in detail in Part Three), which
52
regulates the use of online data, is an antiquated statute. Given the
current state of the ECPA, and despite Facebook’s best efforts to
protect its users, it might be very difficult, from a legal standpoint, for
providers like Facebook to fully protect its users’ information from
53
government access.

III. Statutory and Legal Framework
The ECPA comprises the statutory framework that regulates the
54
government’s seizure and use of electronic data. The ECPA gives
the government access to both content and non-content data in stored
wire or electronic communications. The statute “governs government
access to stored wire and electronic communications in a ‘facility’
55
through which an electronic communication service is provided.”
Sections 2703 and 2709 of the ECPA in particular have been the
subject of the most relevant litigation about the legal issues
surrounding access to social networking data.

48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See infra Part III.
52. James Aquilina, Executive Managing Director and Deputy General Counsel at
Stroz Friedberg, Does Overt Access to Social Networking Data Constitute Searching or
Spying?, address at Samuelson Conference, (Oct. 23, 2009), available at http://www.law.
berkeley.edu/7458.htm; see also, infra note 52.
53. Aquilina, supra note 50.
54. Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711
(2010). The portions of the ECPA discussed in this note are commonly referred to as the
“Stored Communications Act” (“SCA”).
55. 18 U.S. NITA prec §2701.
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Under the ECPA section 2703, if the contents of a wire or
electronic communication have been in electronic storage or in an
electronic communications system for one hundred and eighty days or
less, a “governmental entity may require the disclosure . . . only
pursuant to a warrant issued [pursuant to procedures under Federal
56
or State law] . . .” If, however, the contents of a wire or electronic
communication have been in electronic storage in an electronic
communications system for more than one hundred and eighty days,
the government may obtain them either by a warrant (without notice
to the subscriber or customer), by an administrative subpoena
authorized by a federal or state statute or a federal or state grand jury
or trial subpoena (with prior notice to the subscriber or customer), or
57
a court order for disclosure.
The ECPA, as amended and expanded by the USA Patriot Act,
gives an electronic service provider or a remote computing service
provider discretion to voluntarily disclose content and non-content
58
information to the government.
If it is determined that the
“provider, in good faith, believes that an emergency involving danger
of death or serious physical injury to any person requires disclosure
without delay of information relating to the emergency,” he may
divulge a record or other information pertaining to a subscriber to or
59
customer of such service to a government entity.
Section 2709 of the ECPA governs the procedure that allows the
FBI to gain access to subscriber information or electronic
communication transactional records if it is relevant to an authorized
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine
60
intelligence activities. In these circumstances, the FBI may request
(through national security demand letters, (“NSLs”) the “name,
address, length of service, and local and long distance toll billing
records of a person,” so long as the government’s investigation of
such person is not conducted solely on the basis of activities protected
by the First Amendment.
Section 2709 also allows the FBI, in the event of national security,
criminal, counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, to
61
prevent disclosure of such a request for information to any person.

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

18 U.S.C. §2703(a).
18 U.S.C. §2703(b).
ECPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2010).
18 U.S.C. §2702(c)(4).
18 U.S.C. §2709(b)(1).
18 U.S.C. §2709(c)(1).
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As will be further discussed, this so-called “gag” provision has been
the subject of ongoing litigation.
When the government has attempted to gain access to both
content and non-content information, litigation has implicated the
ECPA as it relates to the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens
62
“against unreasonable searches and seizures.” Although there are
cases that have dealt with the Fourth Amendment as it applies to
electronic communications, conspicuously absent is legislation or case
63
law that has made the leap to social networking data specifically.
To date, the legislation that surrounds government access to
electronic data, both content and non-content alike, focuses mainly
upon email and Internet protocol (“IP”) information. What is more,
the laws grant the government access to information often with few
obstacles.
The seminal case for applying the Fourth Amendment comes
64
In Katz, the issue was whether the
from Katz v. United States.
government should have been allowed to introduce evidence of
petitioner’s conversations that were “overheard by FBI agents who
had attached an electronic listening and recording device to the
outside of the public telephone booth from which he had placed his
65
calls.” The court concluded that the “Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places” and that the “[g]overnment’s activities in
electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied . . . and thus
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth
66
Amendment.”
Today, modern extensions of Katz that bear the most similarity to
data on social networking sites are those that surround the
constitutionality of section 2703 of the ECPA, and how it relates to
the government’s seizure of Internet communications, specifically
email. The Supreme Court has yet to formally extend Katz’s Fourth
62. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
63. There are cases, however, that deal with the identity of Internet chat room and
message board users, but those center mostly on the applicability of the First Amendment
and its protection of the users’ identities, rather than the Fourth Amendment right to seize
the information. Sew eg., Doe v. 2TheMart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
64. Joshua L. Simmons, Note, Buying You: The Government’s Use of Fourth Parties
to Launder Data About “The People,” COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950, 960–61 (2009). See also
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
65. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348.
66. Id. at 351, 353.
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Amendment protection to email, and Congress has yet to amend the
ECPA “even as electronic communication technologies have been
67
modified and improved.” The lower courts, however, seem to be
pushing for a change.
68
One such case is Warshak v. United States where an Ohio District
Court “boldly” extended Fourth Amendment protection to email.
This decision affirmed by the Sixth Circuit on December 14, 2010,
holds that the government must have a search warrant before it can
69
secretly seize and search emails stored by email service providers. A
closer examination of the case provides a useful insight into the
debate over information privacy and issues that are arising under the
ECPA as technology progresses at a rapid rate.
In Warshak, the government obtained two orders under the
ECPA’s section 2703(d) to search Steven Warshak’s emails after
Warshak’s company, Berkeley Premium Nutraceuticals, Inc., became
the target of an investigation into “mail and wire fraud, money
70
laundering, and other federal offense[es].” The magistrate judge
granted the application under section 2703(d), which gave the
government access to, among other things, the contents of emails that
had been “accessed, viewed, or downloaded” or that were more than
71
181 days old. After receiving notice of the orders about a year later,
Warshak filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate
section 2703(d) under the Fourth Amendment and moved for a
preliminary injunction, “seeking to enjoin the government from
72
conducting further ex parte e-mail searches.”
The district court
granted Warshak’s injunction, reasoning that Warshak would likely
succeed on his Fourth Amendment claim “because [I]nternet users
73
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails . . .”
After a lengthy subsequent history, the Sixth Circuit announced
that electronic communication “deserved more protection than . . .
74
ECPA provides,” but later proceeded to vacate the opinion,
ultimately arguing that Warshak’s Fourth Amendment claim was not

67. Tamar R. Gubins, Note, Warshak v. United States: The Katz for Electronic
Communication, 23 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 723, 744 (Annual Review, 2008).
68. Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008) (“Warshak I”).
69. Gubins, supra note 66, at 727; see also United States v. Steven Warshak, 2010 U.S.
App. LEXIS 25415, at *2 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Warshak II”).
70. Warshak I, 532 F.3d at 523, 524 (internal quotations omitted).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 523.
73. Id. at 524–25.
74. Gubins supra note 66 at 725.
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75

ripe for judicial resolution. One reason the court gave was that
“[t]he Supreme Court ha[d] been especially reluctant to invalidate
76
statutes on their face under the Fourth Amendment.” In vacating
the preliminary injunction and remanding the case to the district
court to dismiss Warshak’s constitutional claim, the Sixth Circuit held
that Warshak “still retained the right to challenge the district court’s
resolution of his motion . . . through an appeal of his criminal
77
conviction.”
Finally, in its December 14, 2010 opinion, the Sixth Circuit
monumentally extended Katz’s Fourth Amendment protection to
78
email. The court reasoned:
Since the advent of e-mail, the telephone call and the letter
have waned in importance, and an explosion of Internet-based
communication has taken place. People are now able to send
sensitive and intimate information, instantaneously, to friends,
family, and colleagues half a world away. Lovers exchange
sweet nothings, and businessmen swap ambitious plans, all
79
with the click of a mouse button.
When analogizing the situation in Warshak to the social
networking world, it is difficult to know where exactly to extend the
analysis. Facebook users, for example, can send messages to each
other, which function like emails. However, would the information
that a user posts to his profile be considered email communication?
Perhaps the only way to assess what section of the ECPA applies is to
determine how long the content had been on the site and whether it
was “stored” for purposes of the statute.
For example, the Supreme Court has held that the Fourth
Amendment’s protection does not apply when an individual
80
voluntarily discloses information to a third party. In United States v.
Forrester (where defendants were charged with offenses relating to an
ecstasy-manufacturing laboratory), the Ninth Circuit relied primarily
upon a Supreme Court surveillance case, Smith v. Maryland, which

75. Warshak I, 532 F.3d at 523.
76. Id. at 529.
77. Id. at 534.
78. See Warshak II, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
79. Id. at 31–32.
80. United States v. Forrester, 495 F.3d 1041, 1048 (9th Cir. 2007), (quoting Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979)).
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81

involved the constitutionality of pen registers.
Both defendants
were convicted on all counts, and defendant Alba appealed,
82
challenging the validity of the government’s computer surveillance.
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the government’s surveillance
was analogous to the use of a pen register as defined in Smith v.
Maryland and therefore did not constitute a search for Fourth
83
Amendment purposes. Furthermore, the court concluded that “email and Internet users have no expectation of privacy in the to/from
addresses of their messages or the IP addresses of the websites they
visit because they should know that these messages are sent and these
IP addresses are accessed through the equipment of their Internet
84
service provider and other third parties.”
As social networking sites continue to grow and be a principle
means for people to form connections and share information, it is
unsurprising that terrorist groups are also taking advantage of this
85
online medium.
Therefore, the government’s access to data
involving issues of national security falls under the ECPA’s section
2709, which has also been the subject of recent litigation.
Two cases present an illustration of the issues that have arisen as
a result of the Patriot Act’s expansion of the government’s access to
information through the ECPA and the difficulty that the lower
courts are having in resolving the delicate balance between national
security concerns, the ECPA’s section 2709, and individual privacy.
In Doe v. Ashcroft, plaintiffs, who included the American Civil
Liberties Union (“ACLU”), challenged the constitutionality of the
86
ECPA’s section 2709 broad subpoena power with regards to the
87
FBI’s issuance of NSLs. In this case, the lead plaintiff (John Doe),
88
was an Internet access firm that received an NSL.
Section 2709 “bars all NSL recipients from ever disclosing that
89
the FBI has issued an NSL.” The District Court concluded that 1)
section 2709’s nondisclosure provision violates the Fourth

81. Id. at 1043. A pen register is a device that records numbers dialed from a phone
line.
82. Id.
83. Id. (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. 735, 745–46 (holding that the use of a pen register
does not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes)).
84. Forrester, 495 F.3d at 1049; (Internal citation omitted).
85. See Carlin, supra note 24.
86. 18 U.S.C. §2709. See also supra notes 46, 48.
87. Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F.Supp.2d 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y 2004).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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Amendment because “at least as currently applied, it effectively bars
or substantially deters any judicial challenge to the propriety of the
NSL request, and 2) “the permanent ban on disclosure contained in
section 2709(c) . . . operates as an unconstitutional prior restraint on
90
speech in violation of the First Amendment.”
91
A similar issue arose in Doe v. Gonzalez. There, the plaintiff, a
member of a library association, received an NSL requesting
“information . . . associated with a ‘specific Internet Protocol
92
address.’” The complaint alleged that the “gag imposed by section
93
2709(c) is an unlawful prior restraint on speech.”
The district court applied strict scrutiny and concluded that the
permanent gag provision of the statute was not “narrowly drawn to
serve the government’s broadly claimed compelling interest of
keeping investigations secret” and granted Doe’s motion for a
94
preliminary injunction. A panel for the Second Circuit then issued
an order staying the preliminary injunction to give the federal
95
government an opportunity to file an expedited appeal. Upon that
panel’s denial of the applicant’s subsequent motion to vacate the stay,
96
petitioners filed an emergency application to the Supreme Court.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court, held that the applicants had
not shown cause “so extraordinary as to justify [the] Court’s
97
intervention” while the action was pending in the Second Circuit.
Although the government accesses social networking data
through statutory means, it also does so by sidestepping them. While
statutory mechanisms are in place for the official solicitation of data,
as shown by the litigation surrounding sections 2703 and 2709, the
government has used undercover identities and deceptive practices to
gain access to social networking information-actions that are not
98
necessarily illegal under current standards.
In Theofel v. Farey-Jones, the Ninth Circuit considered “whether
defendants violated electronic privacy and computer fraud statutes
when they used a patently unlawful subpoena to gain access to e-mail

90. Id. See also supra notes 58, 60.
91. Doe v. Gonzalez, 546 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2005).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1304–05 (internal citation omitted).
95. Id. at 1301–02.
96. Id. at 1302.
97. Id. at 1308.
98. See supra Part II (including an in-depth look at the government’s use of
undercover agents on social networking sites).
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99

stored by plaintiff’s Internet service provider.” Although the case
involved private parties and not the government, the court provided
some useful dicta on deception as it applies to the ECPA’s section
2701. The court noted that the Stored Communications Act “protects
individuals’ privacy and proprietary interests” and “reflects
Congress’s judgment that users have a legitimate interest in the
confidentiality of communications in electronic storage at a
100
communications facility.”
Although the court stated that a defendant is not liable for
trespass if the plaintiff authorized his entry, it found that a police
officer who “invited in a home, conceals a recording device for the
101
media” is liable. More specifically, the deceit must be a “substantial
mistake . . . concerning the nature of the invasion or the extent of the
102
harm.”
The court then construed section 2701 in light of that
analysis, holding that “permission to access a stored communication
does not constitute valid authorization if it would not defeat a
103
trespass claim in analogous circumstances.”

IV. Analysis and Proposal
As courts have struggled with the ECPA as it applies to the
ongoing growth of technology, many have noted that the ECPA
“provide[s] quite narrowly defined protections [and that] [t]hese
limited provisions do not address the broad, ongoing changes in
104
communications technologies.” The ACLU has also commented on
the intersection between technology, liberty, and surveillance, arguing
that the USA Patriot Act has “vastly expanded the FBI’s authority to
collect information about people it does not suspect of wrongdoing,
including financial, credit and communications information, using
105
NSLs . . .”
Michael Macleod-Ball, Acting Director of the ACLU
Washington Legislative Office, argues, “[o]nce again, the FBI has
been found to be using invasive ‘counterterrorism’ tools to collect

99. 341 F.3d 978, 981 (9th Cir. 2003), amended 359 F.3d 1066.
100. Id. at 982.
101. Id. at 982–83 (internal citations omitted).
102. Id. at 983 (internal citation omitted).
103. Id.
104. Gubins, supra note 66, at 740.
105. Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, FBI Data Mining and Collection
Programs Threaten Privacy of Innocent Americans (Sept. 24, 2009), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pring/national-security_technology-and-liberty/fbi-data-mining-andcollection-programs-threaten-privacy-in (emphasis added).
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personal information about innocent Americans . . . with little or no
106
oversight.”
Thus, there are two main factors that necessitate a change. First,
the ECPA has been expanded by the USA Patriot Act such that there
are often few obstacles preventing the government from gaining
access to data on social networking sites. Second, the rapid growth of
the social networking world has changed the way people
communicate across the Internet. Data sharing has gone from the age
of email messages and IP address logs into a murky web of social
networks and “wall posts.” Therefore, the statutory and legal
frameworks that currently exist are insufficient to encompass the way
that contents are shared across the social network medium. Nor is
this shift reflected in either the provisions of the ECPA or in the
courts’ applications of them.
For example, it is not entirely clear how section 2703 applies to a
site like Facebook. There are probably messages and data that fall
into the category of content that has been posted on the site for one
hundred and eighty days or less, but what about the constant user
behavior and interactions that comprise so much of what makes social
networking sites unique?
The problem of what is content and non-content on social
networking sites also confuses the issue. How would the non-content
provisions of section 2703 that Forrester analogized to pen registers
and applied to the “to/from” addresses in emails apply to behavior on
Facebook? For example, the courts could extend that analogy to the
social networking context by removing the expectation of privacy
from data that a user makes public. For some users, that is merely
who they are friends with on Facebook and the networks to which
they belong, while for others it’s virtually everything on their profiles.
Although there is a compelling argument under Warshak II that
Facebook messages, like email, could likely be subject to a user’s
reasonable expectation of privacy, less clear is how far that
reasonable expectation extends. Of course, any information that a
user purposely makes open and publicly available to the millions on
Facebook would be fair game. However, the problem lies in the
murkier realm of semi-protected data—that is, data that a user only
intends to share with those in a particular limited friend network.
The photos and status updates that a user makes available to that
limited friend network cannot be classified the same way as a private
message intended between two people. However, a user’s ability to
106.

Id.
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control how far the sharing of such data extends is a difficult issue
unique to Facebook and the “network” setting, since that network
could include every person in a large geographic region such as San
Francisco, or a limited group of close friends.
Another problem with the ECPA is in the gag provision of section
2709 that is currently the subject of much debate. If social networks
are quickly becoming a convenient place to facilitate terrorist
communication, then sites like Facebook become an easy target for
the government. If an NSL demands that Facebook hand over the
profile information for a suspected terrorist involved in a matter of
national security, it is likely that the government will also gain access
to information that is not necessarily pertinent to the investigation.
This is because the data on social networks is not as clearly defined or
as compartmentalized as data in emails, for example.
As is evidenced by the current case law surrounding section 2703
and section 2709 specifically, these issues will only continue to present
themselves in the social networking age. Although the case law as it
currently stands extends primarily to email and ISP information, it
seems that even there, the courts have been reluctant to make any
Fourth Amendment extensions without statutory revisions from
Congress.
There needs to be some sort of action from Congress, therefore,
remodeling the ECPA to reflect the technological changes that have
boomed in the past few years. There also needs to be a new Katz, as
Ohm suggested, that defines the Fourth Amendment as it pertains to
social networks. With that definition needs to come an explanation of
what is considered “deception” in the social network medium.
Unfortunately, a cop posing as a drug dealer on the streets to catch a
criminal is not necessarily the same thing as an FBI agent who
assumes a real person’s online identity when that person is taken into
custody.
The counter-argument—that people who post content should be
aware of how visible it is to others—is a compelling one. In a culture
so hooked on sharing information at rapid rates, people need to be
aware that sometimes, what seems private is in fact not so.
Regardless, while some of these individuals may be at fault for
making their data widely known, those who have chosen to keep their
online identities far more private will still be susceptible to
government investigations that are currently not banned by either the
ECPA or Supreme Court precedent.
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V. Conclusion
While it remains unclear to what extent the government is
actually using the data from social networks under the ECPA, the
Samuelson Conference makes it abundantly clear that the
government is obtaining the information. As forums continue to
allow individuals to post content about themselves and communicate
on a widespread level with others, courts are in need of greater
guidance with respect to the government’s search for online
information.

